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Abstract 
 
Physicians are expected to provide the best health care to their patients; however, it cannot be 
discounted that their practice is driven primarily by incentives. In this paper, we construct a physician 
utility maximization model that links physician quality to compensation schemes. Results show that 
relative to fixed payment, fee-for-service and mixed payment yield higher quality. Multinomial treatment 
effects regression of vignette scores on payment schemes also support this hypothesis, indicating that 
physicians are still below the best level of quality and that incentives to improve are still present.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
Equipped with the ability to produce health and prolong life, physicians bear a huge 
responsibility in practicing their profession. With the patient’s life and future productivity in the 
line, the health care profession is considered an esteemed field, operating within a set of 
guidelines and entry barriers to ensure quality [Arrow 1963]. However, benevolence may not 
always be expected from physicians. Like any economic agent, health providers have the 
capacity to alter his services given his financial incentives [Thorton & Eakin 1997]. Income is 
arguably an important factor in determining physician behavior, but the method of channeling 
such income to the physician should also be considered. For example, Barnum, Kutzin, and 
Saxenian [1995] argued that fixed payment tend to reduce services. Fee for service (FFS) tend 
to cause overprovision of services, while mixed payment appears to be a better alternative. 
Most studies have linked payment schemes with physician inputs such as work hours and 
services; however, using these inputs may not be sufficient to capture quality, an important 
dimension in the context of better health outcomes.  
 
This paper attempts to construct a simple physician choice model that will allow us to compare 
quality of care across different payment schemes. The physician chooses his optimal effort level 
that will determine his quality given his income constraints which are then defined by each 
payment scheme. As an empirical support, the paper shall measure differences in scores 
derived from physician quality tests called the vignette across different payment schemes. 
 
 
2.  Payment schemes as incentive for quality 
 
                                                          
* This paper is a condensed version of the author’s Master’s thesis entitled “A theoretical and empirical analysis on 
the relationship between payment schemes and physician quality”, May 2014. 
** Master of Arts in Economics, University of the Philippines School of Economics (UPSE), Diliman, Quezon City 
1101. Email: rtcalub@up.edu.ph. The author would like to thank UPecon—Health Policy Development Program for 
graciously providing the data for the empirical analysis. 
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Payment schemes have been widely mentioned in the literature. Theoretical and empirical 
studies have identified payment schemes observed to increase or decrease motivation.  In the 
health care sector, physicians can choose to work in any of the following payment arrangements  
[Barnum, Kutzin, & Saxenian 1995]: 
 
1. Budgetary transfers – these are fixed, global budgets provided to the facility. Doctors 
are paid fixed remuneration depending on the total hospital budget. 
2. Capitation – this is a typical scheme under insurance or health management offices 
(HMOs). Under this setup, physicians are paid a fixed amount per insured person.  
3. Fee-for-service – this is a common practice in the industrialized countries where 
providers charge according to the number of services provided. 
4. Mixed payment scheme – this is a multi-dimensional payment scheme wherein 
providers can be paid in both fixed, budgetary transfers and fee-for-service. For 
instance, a provider’s fixed cost can be paid through transfers while variable costs 
may be reimbursed through fee-for-service payments. 
 
 
2.1. Studies on payment scheme incentives: a review 
 
Through their conceptual framework, Libby and Thurnston’s [2001] account on health 
management office (HMOs) hypothesized that entering into HMO/capitation arrangements 
generally decrease work hours. Physicians are motivated to enter such arrangement to reduce 
variability in working hours, to comply with group practice decisions, and to advocate managed 
care which is associated with lower cost of care due to early prevention and intervention. On the 
other hand, physicians may choose not to be involved in capitation arrangements if they already 
have large patient bases, if they have concerns over quality of care issues, or if they value 
independence from contractual obligations. Using the 1983-1985 and 1988 Physician Practice 
Costs and Income Surveys (PPCIS), their estimates reveal that while participation in managed 
contracts has a small and statistically insignificant effect on work hours, the intensity of 
participation has a negative effect on work hours. That is, if a physician receives a large fraction 
of his income from managed-care contracts, the physician is likely to serve fewer hours. The 
data also revealed that the primary reason in participating in managed-care contract is to reduce 
the variability in patient load. 
 
Henning-Schmidt, Selten, and Wiesen [2009] conducted a controlled laboratory experiment to 
test the influence of fee-for-service and capitation payments on the quantity of services that the 
physician will order. The experiment involved 42 physicians. Results show that fee-for-service 
induces overprovision on patients whose optimal quantity of service is lower.1 Under capitation 
payment, patients whose optimal quantity of service is higher are likely to be underserved. 
Comparing the two schemes, more services are provided under fee-for-service than in 
capitation payments. Another finding is that patients exert more influence on physician’s 
behavior under capitation payment than under fee-for-service. 
 
Rice [1997] summarized behavioral evidences on fee-for-service and capitation payments. An 
empirical study conducted at the Urban Institute shows that despite payment controls by 
Medicare (the implementing body for FFS), physician payments still increased by 10-12 percent 
in the first phase of controls and 12-19 percent in the second. This suggests increased quantity 
of services provided. Another set of studies in the context of the change in compensation 
schemes in Colorado during the 1970s showed that physicians who received lower Medicare 
                                                          
1 Type 1 and Type 2 patients. 
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payment rates tended to provide greater quantity and intensity of services. Meanwhile, there is 
limited evidence on capitation scheme, which has become the global norm [p. 562]. One study 
in 1987 showed that compared to FFS, physicians receiving salary have 13-percent lower 
hospitalization rates and capitation lowered the rates by 8 percent. Visits per enrollee also fell 
by 10 percent. Another study in Wisconsin HMO showed that the transition from FFS to 
capitation payment increased primary care visits by 18 percent, but reduced referrals to 
specialists by 45 percent. Hospital admissions and length of stay also fell by 16.3 percent and 
12 percent, respectively. 
 
Brennan and Shepard [2010] used specific medical protocols to compare impacts on quality 
between traditional fee-for-service and private insurance Medicare Advantage (MA), which is 
analog to capitation payments, using 11 measures from Healthcare Effectiveness Data and 
Information Sheet (HEDIS). The measures included specific procedures such as annual 
monitoring for persistent medications, antidepressant medication, breast cancer screening, 
persistence of beta-blockers, beta-blockers after heart attack, LDL testing, and diabetics tests 
such as eye exam, A1C testing, LDL testing, and nephropathy. Quality measures are computed 
from the proportion of the population “who received the recommended care in accordance with 
the measure definition [Brennan & Shepard 2010: 842]. Comparisons show mixed results for 
FFS and MA for the administrative measures (persistent medications, among others) and hybrid 
measures (diabetics). 
 
Kim, Steers et al [2007] studied the effect of salary on the likelihood of providing processes 
relevant to diabetes care. They collected data from 1,248 physicians and their 4,200 patients 
through Transnational Research Centers (TRCs) covering 10 health plans. In the unadjusted 
analysis, they found a significant but small relationship between high compensation from salary 
and conduct of dilated eye exam, foot exam, influenza vaccination, and advice to give aspirin 
[Kim, Steers et al 2007: 451]. After adjusting for health plan, physician, and patient 
characteristics, however, no correlation was found between compensation scheme and 
treatment process.  
 
It should be noted that, with the information advantage over patients, providers’ can extend a 
level of influence in implementing a particular payment scheme. Demange and Geoffard [2006] 
constructed a model to show that shifting from any payment scheme to another can be 
obstructed by, say, organizational power of physicians. Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer’s [2010] 
have also shown that after selecting a payment scheme, the physician then chooses the optimal 
effort and work hours that will maximize his utility. Devlin and Sarma [2008] also considered this 
in measuring the effect of FFS and non-FFS on patient visits and found that those who engage 
more in non-clinical practice tend to select non-FFS payment schemes; after accounting for that 
selection, physicians who found themselves in non-FFS scheme tend to see significantly fewer 
patients. 
 
Several evaluation studies have also been done in the Philippines to gauge physician quality 
vis-à-vis financial incentives. Through the the Quality Improvement Demonstration Survey 
(QIDS) lead by Shimkhada, Peabody et al [2008], studies such as by Solon, Woo et al [2008] 
and Quimbo, Peabody et al [2008] were able to measure changes in quality of pediatric care 
across payment methods. This large scale randomized controlled policy experiment was able to 
test payment incentive policies, such as the pay-for-performance (P4P) in Peabody, Shimkhada 
et al [2013] that can eventually improve child health outcomes. These series of studies were 
able to show the usefulness of the vignette as a measure of quality, which we will also utilize in 
this paper. 
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3. A model of physician payment scheme and quality 
 
Having discussed the payment scheme incentives on physician quality output, we can establish 
such relationship from a utility-maximization stance. We argue that a typical physician facing 
income constraints that vary according to payment scheme will influence the choice of inputs, 
specifically work hours, which will have an impact on quality of care. 
 
3.1. The utility function 
 
Consider a physician whose overall utility depends on a set of sub-utility functions indexed by 
payment schemes i. From this set of sub-utility functions, the provider is expected to tend 
towards a particular payment scheme 𝑖 such that the resulting sub-utility function strictly 
dominates all other sub-utility functions. In effect, this selected sub-utility function should 
maximize the overall utility function: 
 
 arg max Υ ≔ {𝑈𝑖 | ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑤, Υ(𝑈𝑖) > Υ(𝑈𝑤)} (1) 
 
For a given compensation scheme index, we define the sub-utility function in Equation (2). This 
will be our main model to establish our predictions on quality. 
 
 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢(𝑌𝑖 , 𝑙𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) (2) 
 
We define 𝑌𝑖 as income associated with the compensation scheme, 𝑙𝑖 leisure, and 𝑣𝑖 some 
measure of quality. The physician gains utility from both income and leisure, hence: 
 
 
𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
> 0,
𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑖
> 0 (3) 
 
We assume that 𝑈𝑖 increases in income and leisure at a decreasing rate, so that: 
 
 
𝜕2𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖2
< 0,
𝜕2𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑖2
< 0 (4) 
 
With the inclusion of a quality variable 𝑣𝑖 in the utility function, we are accounting for the psychic 
benefits to the physician of providing quality services. Specifically, we define 𝑣 as a measure of 
deviation from a benchmark level of “quality”. This relays the idea that being a physician is an 
“honorable work”, and providing quality services yields psychic benefits. Hence, any positive 
deviation should result in a psychic disutility.  
 
 
𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑣𝑖
< 0,
𝜕2𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑣𝑖2
< 0 (5) 
 
We decompose 𝑣 (index omitted for simplicity) as the difference of the physician’s actual score 
𝑉, which we construct as a function of clinic hours ℎ, and the best quality score ?̅?. We define 
𝑉(ℎ) as a score function that maps clinic hours to a quality score.  
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𝑣 = ?̅? − 𝑉(ℎ) (6) 
 
The clinic hours ℎ are cast as a sum of total time allocated to each particular procedure 𝑗, as 
shown below. We argue that each component of a typical health care service such as history-
taking, physical exam, test ordering, diagnosis, and treatment would require a portion of a 
physician’s total time. 
 
 
ℎ = ∑ ℎ𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
 (7) 
 
Therefore, the physician’s allocation of time for all 𝐽 procedures are then transformed into a 
score through 𝑉(ℎ), which will then measure the physician’s quality. For ℎ̅, this would mean that 
the physician is allocating the best time possible for each procedure 𝑗 that would give him the 
best score: 
 
 
ℎ̅ = ∑ ℎ?̅?
𝐽
𝑗=1
 (8) 
 
For any given medical case, we assume that 𝑉(ℎ) can increase with ℎ (i.e. spending longer 
clinic time will allow him to do more procedures) up to a certain pointany additional 
unnecessary procedure will result in a score deduction. Hence, we define the behavior of 𝑉 as 
follows: 
 
 𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
= {
≥ 0, ℎ < ℎ̅
< 0, ℎ > ℎ̅ 
 (9) 
 
Equation (7) explains that each additional work hour increases the score function 𝑉 if ℎ is still 
below the level of work hours that corresponds to the best quality score ?̅?that is, 𝑉(ℎ̅) = ?̅?. In 
contrast, if the physician decides to unnecessarily go beyond ℎ̅, each additional work hour 
decreases the score function 𝑉. We also assume that 𝑉 is U-shaped so that 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
 becomes smaller 
in absolute terms as 𝑉 approaches the best level ?̅?. Hence, for a physician valuing quality, he 
would ensure that he works close to ?̅? to minimize the deviation 𝑣. This roughly follows 
Henning-Schmidt, Selten, and Wiesen’s [2009] specification. 
 
As in standard labor-leisure models, we define leisure 𝑙 as the total available time less clinic 
hours. 
 
 𝑙 = 𝑇 − ℎ (10) 
 
We define a patient demand function which is essential in discussing the income functions. 
Denote 𝐴(𝑣) as a patient demand function of quality deviation 𝑣. Note that since any deviation 
implies low quality, 𝐴 decreases with 𝑣. Importantly, we assume that the patient is fully insured 
so that they can avail of the services as much as they needed without worrying about the cost.  
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 𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
< 0 (11) 
 
Finally, we define the corresponding income equations for each payment scheme. 
 
 𝑌𝑚 = 𝑌0 + 𝑀 (12.a) 
                       𝑌𝑝 = 𝑌0 + 𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏
 (12.b) 
 
Letting 𝑖 = 𝑚 represent fixed payment and 𝑖 = 𝑝 represent fee-for-service, we decompose 
income into a non-practice income component 𝑌0 and the practice income component. For the 
fixed payment scheme, practice income is represented by 𝑀, the fixed payment received by the 
physicians [Equation (12.a)]. In the second equation, the term ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏  refers to the fee-for-
service revenue per case, with 𝑝𝑗 as the fee-for-service rate for procedure 𝑗. This entire revenue 
per case is multiplied by the patient load 𝐴(𝑣) and this total comprises the total practice income 
from FFS.  
 
3.2. The maximization problem 
 
We can then set the sub-utility maximization problem of the physician. Expanding the 
arguments of the sub-utility function in Equation (13), the physician chooses the optimal work 
hours ℎ that will maximize his sub-utility function.  
 
 max
ℎ
𝑈𝑖(𝑇 − ℎ, ?̅? − 𝑉(ℎ), 𝑌𝑖 ) (13) 
 
We then solve for the first-order conditions (FOC) under each payment scheme. Note that with 
the different forms of income 𝑌𝑖, we expect to get different optimal work hours. Hence, solving 
for the optimal work hours will also allow us to determine the corresponding score 𝑉(ℎ∗) and the 
conditions wherein the physician will under-provide (and get lower scores) so that 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
> 0 or 
overprovide so that 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
< 0. 
 
𝜕𝑈𝑚
𝜕ℎ
= −𝑢𝑙 − 𝑢𝑣
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
= 0 (14.a) 
𝜕𝑈𝑝
𝜕ℎ
= −𝑢𝑙 − 𝑢𝑣
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
+ 𝑢𝑌 [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋
𝜕ℎ𝑗
𝜕ℎ
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏
− (
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏
] = 0 (14.b) 
 
We know that solving for ℎ from Equations (14.a) and (14.b) will yield the optimal ℎ∗; however, 
without a specific functional form for 𝑈𝑖 we can only at best infer about how ℎ will differ across 
payment schemes. Nonetheless, we can still determine the behavior of 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
 and draw hypotheses 
on which conditions a particular payment scheme will push the physician to either overprovide 
or underprovide. 
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From Equation (14.a), we can solve for 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
 as seen in Equation (15). 
 
 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
=
𝑢𝑙
−𝑢𝑣
 (15) 
 
By assumption, we know that 𝑢𝑙 > 0 and 𝑢𝑣 < 0. Therefore, Equation (15) will always be 
positive, which means that in fixed payment schemes, the quality scores will always be below 
the best ?̅?. It should be noted that the physician can still be working close to the best quality. If 
the physician values his quality so that 𝑢𝑣 is large, then 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
 will also be small, which means that 
he is performing better but still below the best level. On the contrary, if he values leisure more 
so that 𝑢𝑙 is large, then 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
 is also large, which means that he is performing way below the best 
and any additional effort will have a huge impact on his quality score. Note that since all the 
RHS terms are positive, there is no way for the physician to over-provide in fixed payment. 
 
For FFS, we again isolate 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
 on the left-hand side of Equation (14.b) to determine the conditions 
that will make the physician tend to under-provide or over-provide at the optimal level of work 
hours ℎ∗. 
 
 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
=
𝑢𝑙 − 𝑢𝑌 [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝜕ℎ𝑗
𝜕ℎ ]
−𝑢𝑣 − 𝑢𝑌 [
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
∑ 𝑝𝑗ℎ𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 ]
 (16) 
 
Notice that Equation (16) is an augmented version of Equation (15) through the additional 
bracketed terms. These additional terms capture the income effect of FFS. The bracketed term 
in the numerator [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝜕ℎ𝑗
𝜕ℎ
] is always positive, since patient load 𝐴(𝑣) is positive and 
𝜕ℎ𝑗
𝜕ℎ
 
is positiveany additional ℎ will allow the physician to allocate more ℎ𝑗 for procedure 𝐽. This 
means that the entire numerator can be positive or negative depending on the magnitude of the 
physician’s valuations of leisure 𝑢𝑙 and income 𝑢𝑌. The bracketed term in the denominator is 
always negative because of  
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
, which means that the entire denominator is always positive. 
This shows that FFS has an ambiguous effect on quality, and this effect depends his valuation 
of leisure, income, quality, and patient demand sensitivity. 
 
Suppose that 𝑢𝑌 is large but is still below 𝑢𝑙. Equation (16) will still be positive, but smaller than 
Equation (15), which means that the physician’s quality score will be nearer the benchmark ?̅?. 
Even when the physician values leisure highly so that 𝑢𝑙 is large, the numerator will still be 
weighed down by the income effect 𝑢𝑌, implying that there will always be an incentive to 
perform better and closer to ?̅? compared to fixed payment. The potential of FFS to induce 
quality is further magnified with the inclusion of patient demand sensitivity 
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
. When patient 
demand is highly sensitive to quality, the provider will tend to perform better so that 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
 is 
smaller. With the inclusion of the income terms, we can also infer that the physician can perform 
better in FFS than in fixed. 
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While potentially useful to induce quality, FFS can also lead to overprovision, again conditional 
on the physician’s behavior. If the physician values income so much that 𝑢𝑌 > 𝑢𝑙, the RHS of 
Equation (16) becomes negative. Consequentially, 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
< 0, which means that he is already 
overproviding. Such incentive to over-provide increases when the physician’s valuation of 
quality 𝑢𝑣 is very low or if the patient demand sensitivity 
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
 is very low. This implies that in the 
case where the physician values income more relative to quality and if the patients are not 
aware of the physician’s quality, there is a large tendency to over-provide. 
 
3.3. Combining fixed and FFS: the mixed payment scheme 
 
Pure payment schemes, however, may lead to over- or under-provision of services. For 
example, in the fixed payment scheme, it is possible for the physician to work shorter hours, and 
produce less quality services if the he does not value quality.  On the other hand, there is the 
possibility that physicians will overprescribe in the FFS, again possibly to the extent that quality 
is compromised.  With this, the literature proposed mixed payment scheme as an alternative to 
address these deficiencies. As described by Barnum, Kutzin, and Saxenian [1995], mixed 
payment scheme is an “ideal” choice given its benefits in terms of quality motivation and 
efficiency. In their words, the mixed system retains the desirable characteristics of pure payment 
systems (fixed payment and FFS) while preventing their adverse incentives. Ellis and McGuire 
[1986] supported this view mathematically, noting that this system rewards efficient level of 
services while deterring physician-induced demand for services. 
 
We can predict its effect on quality by reconstructing the income equation as the weighted 
average of fixed payment and FFS: 
 
 𝑌𝑚𝑝 = 𝑌0 + 𝑎𝑀 + 𝑏 [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏
] (17) 
 
where 0 < 𝑎 < 1 and 0 < 𝑏 < 1 denote the weights of the fixed payment component and the 
FFS component, respectively. In this equation, we are establishing that the physician receives a 
fixed payment component after satisfying a minimum number of work hours; and FFS for 
working beyond the minimum. Given this, we can construct 𝑎 and 𝑏 as endogenous functions of 
the physician’s time allocation: 
 
 𝑎 =
𝑀
𝑀 + [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ]
 (18.a) 
 𝑏 =
[𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ]
𝑀 + [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ]
 (18.b) 
 
Equations (18.a) and (18.b) shows the share of fixed payment and the share of FFS with 
respect to the total practice revenue, respectively. These shares, in turn, can be linked to the 
physician’s choice of work hours in this way. Suppose that the time spent for FFS practice, ℎ𝑝, 
is as follows: 
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 ℎ𝑝 = ℎ − ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛 (19) 
 
where  ℎ is total work hours as before, and ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛 minimum work hours required to receive fixed 
payment. Thus, any additional work hours translate one-is-to-one to additional time spent for 
FFS practice; 
𝜕ℎ𝑝
𝜕ℎ
= 1. 
 
Since 𝑎 + 𝑏 = 1, any increase in income received from fixed payment will reduce the share of 
revenue from FFS and vice-versa, indicative of an implicit trade-off in work hours that the 
provider is willing to provide given the proportion of income received. 
 
For simplicity of notation, define 𝐹 as as the bracketed term in Equation (14.b), which is just the 
partial derivative of Equation (12.b) with respect to ℎ: 
 
 𝐹 =
𝜕𝑌𝑝
𝜕ℎ
=  [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝
𝒋
𝜕ℎ𝑗
𝜕ℎ
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏
− (
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏
] (20) 
 
Given this, the physician again chooses work hours to maximize utility. To get the optimal ℎ, we 
still plug Equation (17) in Equation (13) but for a clearer presentation, we derive first the partial 
derivative of 𝑌𝑚𝑝 with respect to ℎ. 
 
 
𝜕𝑌𝑚𝑝
𝜕ℎ
= 𝑎′𝑀 + 𝑏′ [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏
] + 𝑏𝐹 (21) 
 
where we denote 𝑎′ and 𝑏′ as the derivatives of 𝑎 and 𝑏 with respect to ℎ, respectively.  
Compute first for 𝑎′ and 𝑏′ then simplify: 
 
 
 
𝑎′ = −
𝑀
(𝑀 + [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ])
2 𝐹 (22) 
 𝑏
′ =
𝑀
(𝑀 + [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ])
2 𝐹 (23) 
 
We then plug Equations (22) and (23) back to Equation (21) and solve for the FOC of mixed 
payment, giving us Equation (24.a). Notice that with the inclusion of the bracketed term, the 
income incentive now depends on the relative weight of either fixed payment or FFS. If 𝑀 = 0 
and 𝑝𝒋 > 0 for all 𝑗, the bracketed term cancels to one and Equation (24.a) becomes the FFS 
FOC; on the other hand, if 𝑝𝒋 = 0 for all 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽 and 𝑀 > 0, the entire second term 
disappears and Equation (24.a) reverts to the fixed payment FOC. 
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 −𝑢𝑙 − 𝑢𝑣
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
+ 𝑢𝑌 [
[𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ]
2
− 𝑀 (𝑀 − 2 [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ])
(𝑀 + [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ])
2
] 𝐹 = 0 (24.a) 
 
Setting 𝛾 = [
[𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ]
2
−𝑀(𝑀−2[𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ])
(𝑀+[𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ])
2 ] for simplicity, we can easily isolate 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
 from 𝐹 by 
rearranging the terms to get Equation (24.b): 
 
 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
=
𝑢𝑙 − 𝑢𝑌𝛾 [𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝜕ℎ𝑗
𝜕ℎ
]
−𝑢𝑣 − 𝑢𝑌𝛾 [
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
∑ 𝑝𝑗ℎ𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 ]
 (24.b) 
 
Earlier we have shown that FFS can potentially increase scores assuming that the physician’s 
income valuation is positive, with the effect magnified by his valuation of quality 𝑢𝑣 and patient 
demand sensitivity 
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
. With the inclusion of 𝛾 = [
[𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ]
2
−𝑀(𝑀−2[𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ])
(𝑀+[𝐴(𝑣) ∑ 𝑝𝒋ℎ𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 ])
2 ], the incentive 
to increase quality is somehow tempered, especially when the fixed income portion 𝑀 is high. If 
the fixed payment component becomes higher relative to the FFS component, then this weight 
decreases, which means that the FFS effect is also dampened. Practically, when the fraction of 
his fixed payment increases, he need not provide longer work hours since he may already 
receive sufficient remuneration which could otherwise be obtained through fee-for-service. On 
the other hand, if 𝑀 is small, Equation (24) moves closer to the FFS condition. In incentive 
terms, these suggest that the inclusion of a fixed term can potentially decrease labor supply and 
place the physician farther from the best quality level, since he may opt to have more leisure 
while earning 𝑀 with less effort. 
 
The benefits of mixed payment scheme on quality is better observed when the physician values 
income more than leisure so that 𝑢𝑙 < 𝑢𝑌. The reduction in 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
 due to high 𝑢𝑌 can be softened by 
a small 𝛾, which is possible when 𝑀, the fixed payment share, is high. The higher fixed income 
component therefore induces the physician to reduce work hours, since he now receives an 
amount that could otherwise be earned by calling for unnecessary procedures. 
 
3.4. The case of capitation payments 
 
In addition to fixed, FFS, and mixed payment, physicians can be paid by way of capitation 
payments.  Usually adopted in health management organizations (HMOs), capitation payments 
involves paying the physician “periodic fixed amount per insured person to finance the costs of a 
defined package of services” [Barnum, Kutzin, & Saxenian 1995: 6].  In our model, we can 
denote income from capitation in Equation (a) below: 
 
 𝑌𝑘 = 𝑌0 + 𝑘𝐴(𝑣) (25) 
 
where 𝑘 is per person fee or the capitation rate and 𝐴(𝑣) the patient load. Plugging this in 
Equation (13) and maximizing, we get the FOC: 
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𝜕𝑈𝑘
𝜕ℎ
= −𝑢𝑙 − 𝑢𝑣
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
− 𝑢𝑌 [𝑘 ∙
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
] = 0 (26) 
 
We can again isolate the marginal change in scores to obtain Equation (27) below: 
 
 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
=
𝑢𝑙
−𝑢𝑣 − 𝑢𝑌𝑘 [
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
]
 
(27) 
 
Equation (27) shows that at the optimal work hours ℎ∗, the physician will tend to underprovide 
since the LHS becomes positive; however, he will be working at a higher quality than fixed 
payment because of 𝑢𝑌𝑘 [
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
], which represents the income incentive from capitation payments. 
Notice that a higher income valuation 𝑢𝑌 or higher patient sensitivity 
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑣
, the physician will tend 
to work at his best quality possible, making 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕ℎ
 smaller and 𝑉 closer to ?̅?. This is intuitive since 
his source of income is his patients. By ensuring that his quality is close to the best level, his 
patient load will be higher, which means that the revenue received will also be higher. It is also 
important to note that there is no way for the physician to over-providehe has no incentive to 
provide unnecessary services at the expense of his patient load and effectively his revenue. 
 
In the previous section, we have discussed how payment schemes will affect quality given that 
the physicians choose their optimal work hours. By inspecting the first-order conditions, we can 
see that the optimal work hours ℎ∗ differ across payment schemes, which then results in 
different quality scores 𝑉. The presence (or absence) of income incentives explains the 
differences in quality. We observed that fixed payment scheme yields the lowest level of quality 
compared to other payment schemes due to lack of income incentive and that the only way for 
the physician to perform closer to the best level is for him to value quality more. We also 
observed that FFS can reward quality due to income incentive, but posited that there is a 
possibility of over-providing especially when the sensitivity of patient demand is low and the 
valuation of income is very high relative to his valuation of quality. We also saw how mixed 
payment scheme can temper the possibility of overprovision by inducing the incentive to cut 
down on unnecessary procedures by giving them a fixed amount without the need to increase 
procedures. Table 3.1 summarizes these predicted effects on scores. 
 
Table 3.1: Predicted relationships 
Payment Scheme Effect on quality 
Fixed Low 
FFS Ambiguous, depends on physician valuation of 
leisure, income, and quality; and patient demand 
sensitivity. 
Mixed Ambiguous, but a tempered case of FFS due to 
the income share term. 
 
 
Solving for ℎ in each compensation scheme allows us to express ℎ∗ as a function of the 
exogenous variables. Each payment scheme, therefore, has an optimum ℎ and corresponding 
𝑉. Substituting in 𝑉 gives us Equation (28).  
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 𝑉(ℎ∗) = 𝑉(𝑀, 𝑝𝑗 , 𝑚𝑝; 𝑌0, ?̅?, 𝑇) (28) 
 
In this equation, quality is now a function of payment schemes 𝑀, 𝑝𝑗, and 𝑚𝑝 for the mixed; 
non-practice income 𝑌0; benchmark score ?̅?; and total available time 𝑇. This specification can 
then be used as a basis for econometric model. 
 
4.  Empirical analysis 
 
With Equation (28) as the conceptual basis, we conduct an empirical analysis using the 2007 
Operational Plan (OP) Baseline survey2 commissioned by the UPecon Health Policy 
Development Program.3 The physician survey portion was used to capture payment schemes 
and other confounding characteristics, while vignettes scores were used to measure quality. 
Several studies such as Peabody, Luck et al [2000], Luck, Peabody, Dresselhaus et al [2000], 
Dresselhaus, Peabody et al [2000], and Dresselhaus, Peabody et al [2004] have validated the 
effectiveness of the vignette as a quality measure, while policy experimental studies such as 
that of Shimkhada, Peabody et al [2008], Solon, Woo et al [2009], Quimbo, Peabody et al [2008] 
have exhibited practical applications of the vignette in measuring changes in quality with respect 
to changes in policy.  The study implemented Deb and Trivedi’s [2006] multinomial treatment 
effects regression to measure the differences in physician vignette scores across payment 
schemes while accounting for the endogeneity coming from the physician’s selection of 
payment schemes. With vignette scores as the dependent variable, we construct the empirical 
model: 
 
 
𝑉 = 𝜷𝑿 +  𝝋𝒀𝟎 + 𝜹?̅? + 𝝉𝑻 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝜔𝑖
𝐽
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀0 (29) 
 
where 𝑉 is the vignette score, 𝑿 the vector of compensation schemes, 𝑻 vector of time proxies, 
and 𝜀0 error term. To account for the endogeneity, we set up 𝑿 as a function of some factor 𝒛 
that can influence selection of payment scheme without necessarily affecting the scores: 
 
Pr(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑖 | 𝑌0, ?̅?, 𝑇, 𝒛, 𝜔) = 𝑔(𝜶𝒛; 𝑌0, ?̅?, 𝑇, 𝜔𝑖) (30) 
 
Equations (29) and (30) are linked by the common unobserved factor 𝜔𝑖, which then captures 
the selection bias in the payment scheme equation. To estimate Equations (29) and (30), we 
run a maximum simulated likelihood regression of Equation (31): 
                                                          
2 The Operational Plan (OP) Baseline survey is a data-collection project commissioned by the Health Policy 
Development Program (HPDP)  in 2007 to obtain information on health facilities, provider, and patients which are 
otherwise unobtainable from regularly conducted national surveys [UPecon—Health Policy Development Program  
2011]. This information is important in generating baseline monitoring and evaluation estimates to assess the impact 
of HPDP technical assistance given its focus on maternal, neonatal, and child health and nutrition (MNCHN). OP 
baseline covers a wider range of municipalities, facilities, and medical cases. The data covered facility information 
from October 2005-September 2006 while the physician survey covered information in the past 5 years. 
3 The Health Policy Development Program (HPDP) is a five-year project of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) implemented by the UPecon Foundation, Inc. to provide support to the Department of Health 
in the formulation and implementation of policies relevant to family planning, maternal, neonatal, child health and 
nutrition (FP-MNCHN) and TB. For more information, see http://www.usaid.gov/philippines. 
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Pr(𝑉, 𝑋𝑖|𝑌0, ?̅?, 𝑇, 𝜔) = 𝑓 (𝛼 + 𝜷𝑿 + 𝝋𝒀𝟎 + 𝜹?̅? + 𝝉𝑻 + ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝜔𝑗
𝐽
𝑖=1
) ∙ 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑖|𝒛, 𝑌0, ?̅?, 𝑇, 𝜔) (31) 
 
Function 𝑓(∙) refers to the distribution of the outcome variable, which we assume to be normal4, 
while 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑖|𝒛, 𝑌0, ?̅?, 𝑇, 𝜔) is the distribution function of the treatment variable, which is 
assumed logit. Since  𝜔 is unknown, the simulation-based estimation will pick pseudo-random 
numbers based on Halton sequences [Deb & Trivedi 2006] in lieu of 𝜔. The number of pseudo-
random draws is manually specified at 1000 draws for higher precision, as recommended by 
Deb and Trivedi [2006].5 Note that the coefficient 𝜆𝑖 also captures the selection bias; if 𝜆𝑖 = 0, 
then the treatment is exogenous to the outcome. A simple joint hypothesis test (likelihood ratio 
test) of all 𝜆𝑖 will be implemented to test for the exogeneity of the treatment.  
 
To estimate Equation (31), we used the variables listed in Table 4.1. Vignette scores are 
derived from the physician’s performance in areas of history taking, physical exam, test 
ordering, diagnosis, and treatment, covering the cases of diarrhea, pediatric pneumonia, 
pulmonary tuberculosis, and pre-eclampsia [UPecon—Health Policy Development Program 
2011]. The payment scheme variables are derived from the responses on the question “How are 
you [the physician] compensated” of the physician survey. The responses are then reduced into 
three categories: fixed payment, fee-for-service, and mixed. Due to lack of valid response, we 
were not able to include capitation payment as a category; hence, it is excluded from the 
empirical analysis. Physicians who are employed with salary; trainees; in retainer; contractual; 
or in stipend are all classified under the fixed payment category. Physicians who own the 
practice in the facility6; receive fee for service from owner or professional fee; are self-employed; 
or classified themselves as private consultants or receiving per-consultation fees are all 
classified under FFS. Finally, physicians paid the basic pay plus fee for service or physicians 
who received salary plus a reimbursement from Philhealth are considered under mixed 
payment. Note that only those physicians who do not own the practice in the facility were asked 
questions about their compensation schemes; hence, to fill up for the missing values, we 
assume that take those who own practice in the facility as are paid through fee-for-service 
(FFS).  
 
It is notable that average score of physicians did not exceed even the 50-percent passing 
threshold. About four physicians even managed to score below 10 percent. Vignettes are 
roughly distributed equally across the sample, registering about 20 percent of physicians for 
each vignette type. About 70 percent of the sample is female doctors and about 20 percent of 
the physicians hold other positions.  
 
Table 4.1: List of explanatory variables 
Explanatory 
variable Interpretation Proxy for Mean Std. Dev. 
Vignette score Vignette score in percent 𝑉(ℎ) 43.393 17.571 
Fixed payment =1 if MD receives fixed payment, 0 
otherwise (base variable) 
𝑀 
0.276 0.447 
FFS =1 if MD receives FFS, 0 𝑝𝑗 0.337 0.473 
                                                          
4 Histogram chart of vignette score approximates the normal distribution. 
5 In this article, Deb and Trivedi stated that there is no explicit rule in the selection of simulation draws. In the case of 
endogenous models, higher draws are recommendedusually as large as computationally reasonable. 
6 This is a key assumption in our data. 
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Explanatory 
variable Interpretation Proxy for Mean Std. Dev. 
otherwise 
Mixed = 1 if MD receives mixed payment, 
0 otherwise 
𝑚𝑝 
0.387 0.487 
Has other 
professional 
work 
= 1 if the physician indicated that 
he holds other professional 
work/position, 0 otherwise 
𝑌0, 𝑇 
0.212 0.409 
Pneumonia = 1 if MD answered pneumonia 
vignette, 0 otherwise (base 
variable) 
?̅? 
0.233 0.423 
Diarrhea = 1 if MD answered diarrhea 
vignette, 0 otherwise 
?̅? 
0.229 0.421 
TB = 1 if MD answered TB vignette, 0 
otherwise 
?̅? 
0.283 0.451 
Pre-eclampsia = 1 if MD answered pre-eclampsia 
vignette, 0 otherwise 
?̅? 
0.255 0.436 
Gender = 1 if MD is female, 0 if male 𝑇 0.667 0.472 
Age Physician’s age 𝑇 42.094 11.167 
Age squared Square of physician’s age 𝑇 1896.354 1072.19 
Specialty 
society 
member 
= 1 if MD has specialty society 
membership, 0 otherwise. 
?̅? 
0.519 0.5 
Clinic = 1 if MD is sampled at clinic, 0 
otherwise. 
𝑇 
0.269 0.444 
Primary 
hospital 
= 1 if MD is sampled at a primary 
hospital, 0 otherwise. 
𝑇 
0.156 0.363 
Secondary 
hospital 
= 1 if MD is sampled at a 
secondary hospital, 0 otherwise. 
𝑇 
0.198 0.399 
Tertiary 
hospital 
= 1 if MD is sampled at a tertiary 
hospital, 0 otherwise 
𝑇 
0.377 0.485 
Source: Author’s calculation based on HPDP OP Baseline Physician Survey, UPecon-Health Policy Development Program 
 
In the first-stage regression, an urban-rural dummy is used as an instrumental variable for 
payment scheme selection. Results show a strong tendency to belong to payment schemes 
other than fixed in urban areas. The predominance of public facilities in rural areas may explain 
the lack of alternative payment scheme options for the physicians; hence, providers have no 
choice but fixed payment. Holding other professional position appears to have no selection 
effect on any of the payment schemes. Age also tends to have a positive effect in the choice of 
either FFS or mixed, although this effect diminishes as the physician gets older. Other than 
being a proxy of 𝑇, age can also indicate experience, which provides a leverage for the 
physician to select a payment scheme deemed appropriate to his length of stay in the field. At 
least for FFS, physicians in specialty societies are likely to select this scheme. It is also 
interesting to note that physicians in hospitals are not likely to select pure FFS. One possible 
reason is that physicians in clinics, which is our base variable for facility type, may have the 
leverage to implement FFS and are not likely to receive fixed payment as those in hospitals. On 
the other hand, being in a hospital does not increase the probability of selecting mixed payment 
over fixed payment because this scheme may be a common practice, at least for tertiary 
hospitals. For example, if a hospital is Philhealth-accredited, the physicians can receive 
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reimbursements for their services on top of their monthly fixed payment present, hence 
considered as a mixed payment scheme. 
 
Table 4.2: First-stage multinomial logit regression: Choice of compensation scheme 
(base = fixed payment) 
Explanatory variables FFS Mixed 
Physician located in urban 
area 
1.04** 
(0.34) 
0.92** 
(0.31) 
Vignette type   
       Diarrhea -0.53 
(0.42) 
-0.10 
(0.36) 
       TB 0.23 
(0.36) 
0.08 
(0.36) 
       Pre-eclampsia 0.30 
(0.40) 
0.16 
(0.38) 
Female 0.35 
(0.32) 
-0.12 
(0.30) 
Holds other professional 
position 
0.32 
(0.33) 
-0.33 
(0.33) 
Age 0.38** 
(0.07) 
0.27** 
(0.08) 
Age-squared -0.003** 
(0.0007) 
-0.002** 
(0.0008) 
Membership in specialty 
society 
1.21** 
(0.28) 
0.24 
(0.27) 
Facility fixed effects   
     Primary hospital -1.79** 
(0.46) 
0.03 
(0.43) 
     Secondary hospital -2.34** 
(0.40) 
0.37 
(0.40) 
     Tertiary hospital -1.53** 
(0.36) 
0.90** 
(0.37) 
Constant -10.75** 
(1.91) 
-7.56** 
(1.78) 
N 576 
Halton quasi-random draws 1000 
**-Indicates significance at 5% or better; *-Indicates significance at 10% or better. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on HPDP OP Baseline Physician Survey, UPecon-Health Policy Development Program. 
 
 
With payment scheme selection accounted for, we now proceed with the regression of vignette 
scores on payment schemes. Table 4.3 shows the estimation results. Note that the estimation is 
run simultaneously and we separated the presentation for clarity. The lambdas indicate the 
necessity of multinomial treatment effects in estimating the effect of payment schemes on 
vignette scores. The significance7 of these lambdas indicates that without accounting for the 
selection, coefficients of FFS and mixed will be biased. 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Likelihood ratio test rejects exogeneity at 5% level of significance. 
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Table 4.3: Estimation results: Vignette Score (in percent) (base = fixed payment) 
Explanatory variables  
Compensation scheme  
FFS 10.99** 
(0.04) 
Mixed 3.30** 
(0.05) 
Vignette type  
Diarrhea 1.37** 
(0.07) 
TB -25.57** 
(0.05) 
Pre-eclampsia -28.64 
(0.06) 
Female 3.88** 
(0.04) 
Holds other professional position -1.36** 
(0.05) 
Age -0.07** 
(0.01) 
Age-squared -0.002** 
(0.00009) 
Specialty society member -2.20** 
(0.04) 
Facility fixed effects  
Primary hospital -0.38** 
(0.06) 
Secondary hospital 0.70** 
(0.06) 
Tertiary hospital -0.14** 
(0.04) 
Constant 58.57** 
(0.26) 
  
Lambda  
Lnsigma -2.25** 
(0.16) 
Lambda FFS -11.15** 
(0.01) 
Lambda mixed -1.03** 
(0.02) 
Sigma 0.10 
(0.02) 
N 576 
Wald chi-squared statistic ** 
Halton quasi-random draws 1000 
**-Indicates significance at 5% or better; *-Indicates significance at 10% or better. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on HPDP OP Baseline Physician Survey, UPecon-Health Policy Development Program. 
 
Discussing the control variables, we can see significant, negative coefficients for TB and pre-
eclampsia vignettes, perhaps reflecting the difficulty of these cases relative to child pneumonia. 
Female physicians scored higher by 4 percentage points than males. Holding other professional 
positions appears to place a burden on the physician’s total available time, resulting in lower 
scores. Age, however, slightly reduces quality score by 0.07 percentage points and appears to 
continuously decrease quality. At the mean age of 42, scores are lower by 0.24 percentage 
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points, falling further as the physician ages. Notably, membership in specialty society is 
associated to lower scores of about 2.2 percentage points, and this appears to be a strong 
result even after controlling for vignette type. Combining the findings on physician vignette, age, 
and specialization, it appears that the younger, unspecialized physician perform better in the 
vignette test than the older, specialized ones.  For the facility controls, providers in the primary 
hospitals scored 0.38 percentage points lower than those in clinics; secondary hospitals 0.7 
percentage points higher; and tertiary hospitals 0.14 percentage points higher. The sizeable 
decline in scores of primary hospital physicians over clinicians may be indicative of the heavy 
patient load in these facilities. Meanwhile, the positive coefficient in secondary hospitals may 
indicate lighter patient load as cases may be referred to tertiary facilities whose coefficient is 
also negative but not as large in magnitude as in primary hospitals.  
 
The coefficient estimates on vignette type, our local physicians’ capacity to attend to complex 
cases is also concerning. The results have shown that even with specialization, TB and pre-
eclampsia seem to be a difficult case to handle. While it can be argued that the test itself or the 
scoring rubrics may be too difficult or the administration of the test may have been inconvenient 
to the doctor, the low scores call for quality evaluation of providers specializing in those fields. 
 
Controlling for the selection, FFS and mixed payment increase vignette scores by about 10.99 
percentage points and 3.3 percentage points, respectively. This supports our theoretical 
predictions that as long as the physician remains below the best level ?̅? and as long as patient 
load is sufficiently high, FFS encourages quality compared to fixed payment. Mixed payment 
scheme also induces quality compared to fixed payment, albeit way lower than FFS. These 
positive coefficients indicate that there is still an incentive to improve quality. By looking at the 
cross-tabulation of payment schemes and facility types (see Table 4.4), we can see that while 
many physicians are already in either FFS or mixed, there are still a sizeable number of 
physicians who are operating in a fixed salary system, especially in public facilities (hospitals 
and RHUs). Hence, there could be a scope for introducing a mixed payment scheme to improve 
quality. At a policy perspective, Philhealth reimbursements may be a viable option. 
 
Table 4.4: Cross-tabulation of compensation scheme and facility type (N=576) 
 
Facility type 
Compensation 
scheme 
Public 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital RHU 
Hospital-
based 
clinic 
Free-
standing 
clinic Total 
       Fixed 78 55 18 7 1 159 
FFS 10 84 2 67 31 194 
Mixed 138 56 11 16 2 223 
       Total 226 195 31 90 34 576 
Source: OP Baseline Physician Survey, UPecon-Health Policy Development Program (HPDP) 
 
While the coefficient results are promising, it appears that compensation schemes are not 
sufficient policy targets to improve quality. Using the margins function, we computed for the 
predicted scores, switching compensation scheme variables on or off while setting the other 
covariates at their actual levels. At a fixed payment baseline, the average predicted score is at 
38.2 percent; if we allow all physicians to choose FFS, the scores will only increase up to 49.2 
percent, still below the passing benchmark of, for instance, 50 percent. The predicted scores in 
mixed are lower at 41.5 percent.  
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We can also predict scores by facility type (public or private) while assuming actual values for 
the other explanatory variables. At fixed payment (that is, we set FFS and mixed to zero), the 
average score in public facilities is 39.3 percent while the score in private facilities is 37.4 
percent. If we introduce FFS, scores in public facilities improved to 50.2 percent while scores in 
private facilities increased only up to 48.4 percent. However, if we introduce mixed payment, 
public facility physicians will only improve up to 42.6 percent and private facility physicians up to 
40.7 percent.  It appears then that the improvement in scores is more pronounced in public 
facilities over private facilities, although scores barely reached the 50 percent benchmark 
(except for FFS in public facilities).  
 
We can also do the same simulation across vignette types. At the baseline, the scores are 
indeed lower for physicians answering the TB and pre-eclampsia vignettes at 25.6 percent and 
24.4 percent, while the pneumonia and diarrhea physicians passed at 52.7 percent and 54.5 
percent, respectively. When all physicians were to receive FFS, TB and pre-eclampsia vignette 
scores increased, but is still way below the passing mark at 36.6 percent and 35.4 percent, 
while pneumonia and diarrhea vignette scores improved. Scores did not increase as much 
under mixed. Again, this shows that while FFS and mixed payment schemes pose positive 
incentives to quality, they do not seem sufficient enough to increase scores up to or beyond the 
passing rate. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have examined how payment schemes influence quality of care, measured by 
the vignettes. We constructed a simple model of physician quality, arguing that the different 
payment schemes yield different optimal work hours, which in turn affects total procedures and 
eventually quality scores. We predicted that, relative to fixed payment, FFS and mixed payment 
lead to higher quality. Using these predictions, we estimated the impact of payment schemes on 
quality by conducting multinomial treatment effects regression to account for endogeneity in the 
choice of payment scheme. We found evidence that relative to fixed payment, FFS and mixed 
payment yields higher vignette scores. On average, physicians under FFS score 11 percent 
higher than fixed payment while physicians under mixed score roughly 3 percent higher than 
mixed. We noted that notwithstanding these results, shifting all physicians to either FFS or 
mixed will barely lead to at least 50 percent in vignette scores. We accounted for endogeneity of 
payment scheme with location (urban-rural) as instrument. Selection of payment schemes is 
also highly affected by physician’s age and, to some extent, specialization. 
 
5.1. Policy notes 
 
These results have shown plausible evidence that payment scheme policies can influence 
quality of care even accounting for incentives for self-selection into payment schemes.  Our 
findings show that there is a stronger incentive in FFS to work harder and therefore provide 
services that input into quality. 
 
In the Philippines, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) is the responsible 
agency in financing providers through the facilities, in support of the Department of Health’s 
Universal Health Care program. Accredited facilities receive reimbursements for services given 
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to members and their dependents. Philhealth data8 shows that as of December 31, 2013, 1,761 
hospitals were accredited from 1,670 in December 2012. Clinics offering primary care benefit 
packages rose to 2,538 from 1,805 in end-December 2012; maternity care packages 2,065 from 
1,476; and TB-DOTS packages to 1,453 from 1,201. As more facilities become accredited, 
more physicians are likely to be entitled to receive FFS reimbursements. Along with the 
increasing Philhealth coverage across the country (through Kalusugan Pangkalahatan), demand 
for health care should also increase. Given the empirical results, providers in the public sector 
(i.e. fixed payment physicians) have the least incentive to provide quality care; nevertheless, 
providing them with opportunities to receive additional fees, for example, in the form of 
Philhealth reimbursements, moves them to a mixed system which will encourage them to 
provide quality services. With the growing number of accredited facilities and membership, 
Philhealth can be a potent mechanism to improve quality. 
 
However, a system with working incentive mechanism and an effective quality monitoring 
mechanism should also be set in place. Along with Philhealth, the Professional Regulatory 
Commission and the Department of Health are the agencies in charge of monitoring entry in the 
profession and accreditation; however, we fall short in monitoring quality, with few and 
unreliable data and difficulty in assessing the use of practice guidelines in the private sector 
[WHO and DOH 2012]. Existence of regular quality monitoring system such as the Physician 
Quality Measure Reporting9 of the American Medical Association (AMA) could fill in gaps in 
quality data. 
 
While children’s diseases, TB, and maternal deaths remain a significant health concern in the 
Philippines, the inclusion of monitoring health-risk factors and emerging infectious diseases may 
also be considered for further research. Improved quality in monitoring of health risks can help 
in curbing non-communicable diseases, which is becoming a concern in both developed and 
developing countries, with 41 percent under-60 deaths coming from low-income economies 
[WHO 2011]. Notwithstanding measurement issues, low vignette scores should not be taken 
lightly by policy makers, especially with the results on TB and pre-eclampsia vignettes. If taken 
as a signal, this poor performance in health service delivery raises questions and issues on 
sufficiency and quality of health care providers, especially in poor and far-flung regions. 
  
                                                          
8 The 2013 Philhealth stats and charts can be downloaded from: 
http://www.philhealth.gov.ph/about_us/statsncharts/snc2013.pdf. 2012 data can be found in: 
http://www.philhealth.gov.ph/about_us/statsncharts/snc2012.pdf.  
9 See more at: https://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/clinical-practice-improvement/clinical-
quality/physician-quality-reporting-system.page 
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